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DEAR GOD, GIVE ME BACK MY BOOKS:  THE STANDARDIZED 
CHAPEL LIBRARY PROJECT AND FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS 
Aamir Wyne* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Early in 2007, the Federal Bureau of Prisons announced that all 
prison chapel reading materials would be limited to a single list of ac-
ceptable publications.1  The impetus behind the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons’s action was a 2004 report from the Department of Justice’s 
Inspector General, which recommended that materials in prison li-
braries be cataloged and possibly tracked to prevent them from being 
used to “incite violence and hatred.”2  Instead of simply cataloging all 
library materials in federal prisons (the task proved too daunting), 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons decided to compile a limited list of ac-
ceptable books in what it called the Standardized Chapel Library Pro-
ject.3  These limitations brought about protests from Congress, First 
Amendment rights groups, and prisoners’ rights groups.  A class ac-
tion suit is pending, but there has been no ruling on the constitu-
tionality of the Standardized Chapel Library Project.4 
The Federal Bureau of Prisons has the right to exclude certain 
materials due to safety issues from prison libraries; however, it cannot 
issue a single, limited list of acceptable religious texts, as such an issu-
ance would unacceptably violate the free exercise rights of prisoners.  
To do so would be a violation of the First Amendment rights of indi-
viduals incarcerated in the federal prison system—unless the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons is able to show that it serves a compelling govern-
mental interest with no viable alternatives.  The prison system should 
either develop an effective means for cataloging and tracking materi-
als within prison chapel libraries, or it should create a standard list of 
materials that are clearly unacceptable.  The Standardized Chapel Li-
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 1 Laurie Goodstein, Critics Right and Left Protest Book Removals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2007, at 
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brary Project, as enacted, unacceptably infringes on prisoners’ free 
exercise rights. 
Under the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”5  As a rule, courts usually do not interfere with prison ad-
ministration, due to the historical belief that convicted felons were 
civilly dead.6  Federal courts have also shown much deference to the 
rules and practices of both federal and state prison administration—
except when this administration infringes upon constitutionally pro-
tected rights.7 
Specifically, the Supreme Court has ruled that in assessing wheth-
er or not a prison regulation infringes upon an incarcerated person’s 
constitutional rights, courts should apply a balancing test that looks 
to the following factors:  (a) if there is a valid governmental interest 
behind the prison regulation in question; (b) whether under this 
regulation the incarcerated person has other means of exercising his 
rights; (c) how the assertion of this right would impact prison costs 
and resources; and (d) whether there are alternative means that can 
be used to satisfy the governmental interest.8  Further, since Con-
gress’s enactment of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”)9 in 2000, the free exercise concerns of pris-
oners have merited a higher level of scrutiny by the courts. 
Judicial attitudes towards the regulation of the federal prison sys-
tem have been characterized largely by deference to decisions made 
by prison officials.10  Federal courts have ruled, on First Amendment 
grounds, with regard to prisoners’ personal possession of certain writ-
ten materials.11  The Supreme Court has found that inmates can be 
deprived of magazines, newspapers, and other written materials if 
prison administrators can demonstrate that this deprivation satisfies 
 
 5 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 6 W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Provision of Religious Facilities for Prisoners, 12 A.L.R.3D 1276, 
1278 (1967). 
 7 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 833 (1977) (noting that prison administrators have 
“wide discretion” to act, insofar as they do so within constitutional bounds). 
 8 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 88–91 (1987). 
 9 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000). 
 10 See, e.g., Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771, 771 (10th Cir. 1954) (“Courts are without pow-
er to supervise prison administration or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules or 
regulations.”); Desmond v. Blackwell, 235 F. Supp. 246, 249 (M.D. Pa. 1964) (holding 
that prison officials could limit the correspondence of Muslim prisoners for reasons of 
safety). 
 11 See Michael J. Yaworsky, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Prison Regulation of Inmates’ 
Possession of Personal Property, 66 A.L.R.4TH 800, 819 (1988). 
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legitimate governmental interests—for example, in order to promote 
prison safety or to create incentives for good behavior.12  Courts have 
further held that prison administrators may also restrict prisoners’ 
access to printed pornographic materials without infringing on First 
Amendment rights.13 
Within prisons, religious activities themselves may be regulated, as 
long as these regulations are not discriminatory, arbitrary, or unrea-
sonable.14  For example, in Cooke v. Tramburg,15 the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey held that banning congregation of Nation of Islam pris-
oners did not meet the standard of “capricious or arbitrary” because 
it served the purpose of preserving prison order.16  Similarly, in Childs 
v. Pegelow,17 the Fourth Circuit held that prison officials did not have 
to adhere to meal times demanded by Muslim inmates, as it would 
unduly strain prison resources and prison officials had already made 
reasonable concessions to the meal times required by Islamic faith.18  
In some cases, prisoners are allowed to access additional materials 
that are only of critical religious value.19  In other cases, prisoners are 
allowed to obtain a wide range of religious materials, ranging from 
books on general religious theory to periodicals—though courts have 
traditionally upheld prison restrictions on these materials if they 
seem to serve the interest of preserving order or safety within the 
prison system.20  By and large, the case history focuses on restrictions 
upon the personal property of the inmates and their ability to obtain 
 
 12 Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530–31 (2006). 
 13 See, e.g., Willson v. Buss, 370 F. Supp. 2d 782 (N.D. Ind. 2005) (upholding restrictions on 
prisoners’ access to homosexual pornography on the grounds that while prisoners had 
the right to possess the material, there was no possible way the prison administration 
could protect inmates possessing such material from reprisals from other inmates); Snow 
v. Woodford, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (restricting prisoners’ access to 
pornographic materials on the grounds that it negatively impacted inmate relations with 
female corrections officers). 
 14 See Shipley, supra note 6, at 1281. 
 15 43 N.J. 514 (1964). 
 16 Id. at 523. 
 17 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963). 
 18 Id. at 490–91. 
 19 See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 255–58 (3d Cir. 2003) (granting a member of the 
Nation of Islam access to religious texts specific to the Nation of Islam). 
 20 See Blazic v. Fay, 251 N.Y.S.2d 494, 494 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (holding that a prisoner 
should not be deprived of a right to receive religious material, unless that material may 
affect the proper discipline and management of the prison system).  But see Ind v. Wright, 
44 F. App’x 917, 921 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that prisoners practicing a religion based 
in white supremacy should not have access to outside materials that could incite racial vi-
olence within prison).  See generally Shipley, supra note 6 (collecting cases). 
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materials from outside of the prison itself.21  It appears that no cases 
deal directly with materials that are already available in the chapel li-
brary of a federal prison and whether or not they can be withdrawn 
or limited without a specific cause.  Case law concerning free exercise 
rights of prisoners, coupled with the passage of RLUIPA, provides 
more guidance on the issue. 
This Comment examines the legal framework surrounding the 
First Amendment rights of individuals incarcerated in federal prisons.  
It aims to determine just what the government’s compelling interests 
are in initiating the Standardized Chapel Library Project, and wheth-
er such an undertaking is compatible with the constitutional rights 
afforded to inmates in federal prisons.  In order to overcome the 
constitutional difficulties of the Standardized Chapel Library Project, 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons must somehow show that the Project 
passes both RLUIPA scrutiny and the Supreme Court’s balancing test 
for prison regulations that infringe on constitutional rights.  In light 
of recent case law, it will be necessary for the Federal Bureau of Pris-
ons to show (1) that there is a valid, compelling governmental inter-
est in creating an enumerated list of religious materials that are to be 
made available in federal prison libraries; (2) that this enumerated 
list will still allow inmates to exercise their First Amendment rights 
with regard to religions; (3) just how allowing uncensored chapel li-
braries in federal prisons will impact prison safety and resources; and 
(4) whether there are other ways the government can achieve the 
ends of the Standardized Chapel Library Project without limiting the 
resources available in chapel prisons. 
It will first be necessary to examine the limitations that the federal 
prison system may exert on a prisoner’s free exercise rights.  By ex-
ploring cases dealing with these matters in the past half-century, a 
theoretical framework of what has been historically allowed and pro-
hibited with regard to religious practice within the federal prison sys-
tem can be established.  Further, such an examination will hopefully 
reveal just how these limitations have interacted with the First 
Amendment. 
The Comment then examines the origins of the Standardized 
Chapel Library Project, comparing the actions of the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons to the recommendations made by the Department of Jus-
tice.  These facts are then applied to the treatment of free exercise 
rights in courts and current legislation to show that the Standardized 
 
 21 See generally Shipley, supra note 6 (collecting cases). 
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Chapel Library Project is in violation of current standards for prison-
ers’ free exercise rights.  In the past, federal courts have allowed pris-
on administrators to limit the exercise of religion if the administra-
tion could make a compelling argument that such limitations 
promoted or aided prison safety.  However, current standards range 
from a test for whether the policy is rationally related, to an examina-
tion of the penological interests, to a compelling interest test.22  After 
examining the application of these standards, the Comment makes 
policy considerations in light of the controversial nature of the Stan-
dardized Chapel Library Project.23 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The degree of First Amendment protection afforded to prisoners 
by courts has waxed and waned throughout history.  Courts have tra-
ditionally weighed the interests of the State against those of the indi-
vidual protected by the Constitution, and have given great deference 
to the determinations made by prison officials, with some emphasis 
on advances in prison efficiency and safety that have been achieved 
through the curtailment of rights.24  Such practice brings with it a 
number of difficult questions, first and foremost whether First 
Amendment rights should be broadly sacrificed for what may prove 
to be either marginal or imaginary gains in security or economic effi-
ciency.  At the heart of the matter rests the question of just what 
rights a prisoner retains when incarcerated, and whether these rights 
should be dictated by prison officials or by judicial interpretation of 
the Constitution.  The progression of prisoners’ free exercise rights 
has grown from an early period of non-recognition, to a multifaceted 
debate that has encompassed the latter half of the twentieth century, 
to contemporary struggles between courts, prison officials, and con-
gressional legislation designed to protect the free exercise of religion. 
 
 22 Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (applying a compelling interest standard 
to a compulsory school attendance law as applied to members of the Amish religion), with 
Resnick v. Adams, 348 F.3d 763 (2003) (upholding a requirement that Orthodox Jewish 
prisoners fill out standard prison forms to receive kosher meals on the grounds that it 
served a legitimate penological interest). 
 23 See Goodstein, supra note 1, at A13. 
 24 Mayu Miyashita, Comment, City of Boerne v. Flores and Its Impact on Prisoners’ Religious 
Freedom, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 519, 544–49 (1999); see Derek L. 
Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four:  Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner 
Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 508–09, 552–53 (2005). 
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A.  The Bad Old Days 
Traditionally, the incarcerated were regarded as possessing no 
rights of their own, with their lives and actions beyond the reach of 
the Bill of Rights.  The classic example is Ruffin v. Commonwealth,25 in 
which Ruffin—an escaped convict who was tried and convicted for 
murdering the officer guarding him—argued that his conviction 
could not be upheld because a jury of his peers did not convict him.26  
The court found that Ruffin possessed no such right because the pro-
tections of the Constitution did not extend to the incarcerated.27  
Writing for the court, Judge Christian explained: 
[A]s a consequence of his crime, [Ruffin] not only forfeited his liberty, 
but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity ac-
cords to him.  He is for the time being the slave of the State.  He is civili-
ter mortuus; and his estate, if he has any, is administered like that of a 
dead man.28 
An individual regarded as civiliter mortuus is considered “civilly dead,” 
and no civil rights can be afforded to him.29  Justice Christian effec-
tively erased the rights identity of prisoners with his ruling, and for 
much of early American history, prisoners were only granted the 
meager rights afforded to them by state laws and prison officials.30  
This included a lack of First Amendment religious rights, which often 
found their utmost limit at traditional American notions of Christian-
ity.31 
Some courts hinted that a viable claim might have existed for 
prisoners’ free exercise rights, but such a cause of action was not util-
ized.  A telling example of this can be found in Justice Field’s opinion 
in Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan,32 heard by a circuit court in California in 
1879.  Ho Ah Kow, a Chinese citizen residing in the United States 
who was arrested and imprisoned in California, had been subject to a 
California law that mandated the shearing off of all prisoners’ hair 
beyond a certain length.33  At the time, it was customary for male 
Chinese immigrants in California to wear a queue, a long braid of 
hair at the back of the head that bore significant social and religious 
 
 25 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871). 
 26 Id. at 790. 
 27 Id. at 796. 
 28 Id. 
 29 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1035 (8th ed. 2004). 
 30 Gaubatz, supra note 24, at 506–07. 
 31 Id. at 506. 
 32 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879). 
 33 Id. at 253. 
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significance.34  Ho Ah Kow alleged that the State of California had in-
fringed upon his rights by forcing him to cut his queue in prison.35  
The court held that the law requiring the hair cutting was invalid on 
equal protection grounds.36  Interestingly, the court also noted that 
the California law was offensive to prisoners’ religious rights, and pos-
ited that prison regulations forcing Jewish prisoners to eat pork 
would be similarly reprehensible.37  In a sense, Ho Ah Kow stepped to 
the threshold of defending prisoners’ free exercise rights, but hesi-
tated at the last moment.  True recognition of a viable claim given to 
prisoners whose First Amendment rights had been infringed did not 
come about until the 1960s. 
B.  The ‘60s:  Free Love, Rock n’ Roll, and First Amendment Rights for 
Prisoners 
Up until the latter half of the twentieth century, courts rarely in-
tervened on behalf of prisoners on free exercise grounds.38  Courts 
took the attitude that it was their place only to decide who was deserv-
ing of punishment, and not to direct the manner in which that pun-
ishment was meted out.39  Then, beginning in the 1960s, courts began 
to become more positively disposed to the notion that prisoners 
could potentially raise free exercise claims, responding to demands 
made in part by the increasing number of religious minorities in 
American prisons.40 
The landmark case during this period was Cruz v. Beto,41 which 
brought the issue of free exercise amongst prisoners to the doorstep 
of the Supreme Court.  Cruz was a Buddhist inmate of the Texas De-
partment of Correction, who alleged that the Department of Correc-
tions prevented him, through punitive means, from holding Buddhist 
services and instructing other prisoners of Buddhist teachings.42  
 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 256. 
 37 Id. at 255. 
 38 Yehuda M. Braunstein, Note, Will Jewish Prisoners Be Boerne Again?  Legislative Responses to 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2339 (1998). 
 39 See, e.g., Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 1952) (arguing that courts should not 
monitor prison administration, and should only intercede when an individual is unjustly 
imprisoned); Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32, 34 (8th Cir. 1952) (holding that courts have 
no ability to supervise the disciplining of prisoners, and may only review habeas claims). 
 40 Gaubatz, supra note 24, at 507. 
 41 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam). 
 42 Id. at 319. 
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When Cruz attempted to share Buddhist materials with other in-
mates, he was placed in solitary confinement and restricted to a diet 
of bread and water.43  At the time, the Texas Department of Correc-
tions only recognized faiths based in Protestantism, Catholicism, or 
Judaism.44  The Supreme Court held that the failure by the Texas De-
partment of Corrections to afford Cruz a “reasonable opportunity” to 
pursue his faith was a violation of Cruz’s free exercise rights under 
the First Amendment.45  The Supreme Court’s holding in Cruz gave 
hope to all inmates who felt that their religious rights were being cur-
tailed.46 
During the years immediately following Cruz, lower courts began 
developing varying standards of review for the free exercise claims of 
prisoners, showing more willingness to enforce prisoners’ rights when 
they were curtailed for reasons of economic efficiency, and less when 
they were retrenched on grounds of prison security.47  A number of 
circuits applied varying tests and levels of scrutiny to prisoners’ First 
Amendment claims.48 
In 1969, the District of Columbia Circuit established a very strict 
standard for examining prisoners’ free exercise claims in Barnett v. 
Rodgers.49  The prisoners in Barnett argued that the District of Colum-
bia jail failed to meet the requirements of their Islamic dietary stan-
dards, violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.50  
Prison officials of the District of Columbia at first argued that prison 
meals did not contain large amounts of pork, and then later, in the 
presence of contrary evidence, argued that making allowances for 
Muslims was not cost effective, as pork products constituted a signifi-
cant portion of prison menus.51  The Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia remanded the case for further examination, holding 
that prisoners’ free exercise rights could only be limited if a “compel-
 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 322. 
 46 Gaubatz, supra note 24, at 507. 
 47 Geoffrey S. Frankel, Note, Untangling First Amendment Values:  The Prisoners’ Dilemma, 59 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1614, 1620–23 (1991); see also St. Claire v. Cuyler. 634 F.2d 109, 116 
(3d Cir. 1980) (holding that prison officials could prevent the use of Muslim head cover-
ings on grounds of security); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (in-
validating prison regulations that deprived Muslim prisoners of pork-free meals on the 
grounds of costs). 
 48 Frankel, supra note 47, at 1622–24. 
 49 410 F.2d 995 (1969). 
 50 Id. at 997. 
 51 Id. at 998, 1001–02. 
  
Apr. 2009] STANDARDIZED CHAPEL LIBRARY PROJECT 1143 
 
ling state interest” existed, and there were “no alternative forms of 
regulation.”52 
The outcome of this era of litigation produced no one clear stan-
dard of treatment for free exercise claims made by incarcerated indi-
viduals.  In the wake of Cruz v. Beto,53 courts began to honor the 
claims of prisoners who felt that prison regulations were infringing 
upon their free exercise rights.  Just what kind of standard under 
which these claims were to be examined was left unresolved—St. 
Claire v. Cuyler allowed greater autonomy for prison officials who 
wished to enhance prison security, while Barnett suggested that a pris-
oner’s free exercise of religion should be ensured unless it came into 
conflict with the compelling interests of the State.54 
C.  The ‘80s:  Big Hair, Big Shoulders, Big Circuit Split 
The 1980s brought further differences in the handling of prison-
ers’ free exercise claims.  In 1980, the Third Circuit in St. Claire v. 
Cuyler applied only reasonable basis review to a Muslim prisoner’s 
free exercise claim, upholding a prohibition of traditional Muslim 
head-covering at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford, 
Pennsylvania on the grounds that it inhibited prison safety disrupting 
prison order.55 
The Seventh Circuit took a more evenhanded approach in Ma-
dyun v. Franzen56 in 1983.  Madyun, an Illinois inmate, argued that his 
Islamic faith prevented him from being searched by female prison 
guards.57  The court applied a balancing test that weighed Madyun’s 
right to free exercise against the State’s interest in uniformly applying 
prison regulations, giving deference to rules that could be “reasona-
bly adapted” to protecting significant state interests.58  The court held 
the State’s ability to frisk Madyun, no matter the sex of the guard per-
forming the search, was more important than Madyun’s free exercise 
rights on grounds of safety and equal employment.59 
 
 52 Id. at 1000, 1003 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406 (1963)). 
 53 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (recognizing cause of action filed by Buddhist prisoner alleging de-
nial of access to prison chapel, prohibition of contact with religious advisor, and solitary 
confinement on account of his sharing religious material with other prisoners). 
 54 634 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1980); Barnett, 410 F.2d at 1000–01. 
 55 St. Claire, 634 F.2d at 113–14, 116. 
 56 704 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 57 Id. at 956. 
 58 Id. at 960. 
 59 Id. 
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The Eleventh Circuit, in 1986, examined the issue in Shabazz v. 
Barnauskas.60  Shabazz, a Muslim inmate of Florida State Prison, ar-
gued that the prison’s prohibition of his ability to grow a beard rep-
resented a violation of his free exercise rights.61  The court held that 
such a claim should be analyzed under the least restrictive means test, 
requiring that the government regulation be rationally related to a 
substantial governmental interest, and that the restriction on the 
right should be no greater than necessary to protect the governmen-
tal interest in question.62  Under this standard of review, the Eleventh 
Circuit upheld Florida State Prison’s prohibition on beards because it 
advanced the legitimate penological interest of prison security.63 
These rulings created a plethora of standards governing prison-
ers’ free exercise rights, with no definitive means of uniform en-
forcement.  An individual incarcerated in one state could conceivably 
have very different free exercise rights than a prisoner incarcerated 
in another.  This lack of legal symmetry did have grounding in pe-
nological security interests, but produced divergent results. 
D.  O’Lone/Turner:  If It’s Reasonable, We Can Take Your Rights Away 
In 1987, the divergence of standards in free exercise claims was 
resolved.  The Supreme Court’s ruling in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz64 
standardized a test for prisoners’ free exercise claims, and reduced 
the level of scrutiny for incursions upon prisoners’ rights to that of 
“reasonableness.”65  In O’Lone, Muslim inmates of a New Jersey prison 
alleged that prison officials had refused to allow them to attend 
Jummah prayers, the traditional noontime Friday service of the Mus-
lim religion.66  New Jersey prison officials argued that regulations sti-
pulated that inmates be working outside prison buildings during the 
times at which the Muslim inmates wished to congregate for prayer.67  
The Supreme Court held that the prison officials had a legitimate se-
curity interest in preventing the association of Muslim prisoners at 
certain times, especially since allowing such Friday congregations 
 
 60 790 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 61 Id. at 1537. 
 62 Id. at 1539. 
 63 Id. at 1540. 
 64 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
 65 Id. at 349. 
 66 Id. at 344–47. 
 67 Id. at 345–46. 
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would place strain on prison resources during prisoner work hours.68  
In forming its opinion, the Court utilized a balancing test that it had 
set out in Turner v. Safly.69  The Turner test mandated that a court as-
sess a number of factors in order to determine whether a prisoner’s 
free exercise rights had been unduly infringed.70  These factors in-
cluded:  (a) whether there is a valid government interest behind the 
prison regulation in question; (b) whether under this regulation, the 
incarcerated person has other means of exercising his or her rights; 
(c) how the assertion of this right will impact prison costs and re-
sources; and (d) whether there are alternative means that can be 
used to satisfy the governmental interest.71 
In Turner, Missouri prison inmates challenged restrictions on their 
right to written correspondence and on their right to marry.72  Mis-
souri prisons had restricted prisoner correspondence to include only 
a prisoner’s family, and had only allowed inmates to marry for “com-
pelling” reasons, arguing that such restrictions were necessary to 
maintain prison security.73  The Supreme Court upheld the restric-
tion on correspondence, applying the above test and ruling that it did 
not infringe on First Amendment rights, but struck down the restric-
tion on marriage as a violation of the prisoners’ Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights.74 
The standards set forth in Turner and applied in O’Lone proved to 
be somewhat problematic.  The Turner test had been conceived in 
order to deal with freedom of speech issues, which sometimes made it 
a difficult fit for free exercise issues.75  The key difficulty hinges on 
the availability of alternative means of practice stated in the Turner 
test.76  There are fundamental differences in the actual practice of the 
rights of free speech and free exercise, despite the fact that both fall 
under the First Amendment of the Constitution.  Analogizing to the 
facts of Turner and O’Lone helps to illuminate these differences.  The 
prisoners in Turner were deprived of their right to certain kinds of 
communication, but the deprivation was acceptable because they 
 
 68 Id. at 351–53. 
 69 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 70 Id. at 88–91. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 81–82. 
 73 Id. at 82. 
 74 Id. at 91, 96–97. 
 75 See Frankel, supra note 47, at 1637–41 (exploring this discordance). 
 76 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 88–91. 
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were allowed to utilize others.77  Similarly, the prisoners in O’Lone 
were deprived of one kind of religious congregation, but the depriva-
tion was acceptable because they could congregate at other times.78  
However, the two rights are not exactly analogous—eliminating one 
avenue of communication when others are present is not the same as 
prohibiting the Jummah prayer—which is roughly the same as elimi-
nating the Sabbath for Jewish or Christian prisoners—while allowing 
prayer at other times.  The point is not that one of these rights 
should trump the other in terms of exchange analysis; the point is in-
stead that the two rights are fundamentally different, and very differ-
ent results flow from analyzing them under a clumsy universal stan-
dard. 
E.  Religious Freedom Restoration Act:  Free Exercise Is Back in Business 
The difficulties created by the application of the O’Lone/Turner 
standard, along with public worries that free exercise claims by pris-
oners were too narrowly examined by courts, were assuaged in 1993 
when Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”).79  The Act mandated that all free exercise claims be exam-
ined under the compelling interest test that had been set forth in two 
early cases,80 Sherbert v. Verner81 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.82  Since the Act’s 
passage, the will of Congress has been added to the prisoners’ strug-
gle to gain free exercise rights. 
Sherbert and Yoder, set almost a decade apart, deal with free exer-
cise claims outside of the prison context.  Their sentiment, however, 
is in line with the D.C. Circuit ruling in Barnett, holding the govern-
ment to a stricter standard when free exercise claims are on the line.83 
In Sherbert, the Supreme Court considered a claim brought by a 
Seventh Day Adventist in South Carolina.84  The plaintiff argued that 
her faith prevented her from working on Saturday, the day that Ad-
ventists regard to be the Sabbath.85  This belief had led her to be fired 
 
 77 Id. at 96. 
 78 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 351–53 (1987). 
 79 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).  These sentiments are echoed in Gaubatz, supra note 24, at 
509. 
 80 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). 
 81 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 82 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 83 Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1000, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
 84 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399–400. 
 85 Id. 
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from multiple places of employ, resulting in her need to apply for 
unemployment benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment 
Compensation Act.86  The State of South Carolina refused to grant 
her the unemployment compensation, arguing that she refused to 
accept work when it was offered to her.87  The Supreme Court took a 
protective stance towards the Free Exercise Clause, and ruled that 
South Carolina, if it wished to uphold a curtailment of the Free Exer-
cise Clause, had the burden of showing that such curtailment repre-
sented a compelling state interest.88  The Court further stated that 
“no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state 
interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, 
‘[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give oc-
casion for permissible limitation.’”89  Ultimately, the Court held that 
South Carolina had failed to meet such a burden.90 
The Court in Yoder applied the same standard that had been set 
out in Sherbert.91  The plaintiffs in Yoder were members of the Old Or-
der Amish religion residing in the state of Wisconsin.92  Under their 
religious traditions, children would attend public or private school 
until the eighth grade, after which time they would withdraw from 
school.93  The plaintiffs believed that high school attendance went 
against their religious tenets.94  The State of Wisconsin had in place a 
law that compelled compulsory attendance of school for all children, 
no matter their religious beliefs, until the age of sixteen.95  Wisconsin 
prosecuted the plaintiffs for removing their children from the educa-
tion system before the appointed time, and the plaintiffs claimed that 
the state violated their free exercise rights.96  The Court held that the 
State of Wisconsin had the burden of proving that forcing the Amish 
children to attend school represented a “state interest of sufficient 
magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the 
 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 403. 
 89 Id. at 406 (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
 90 Id. at 407. 
 91 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972). 
 92 Id. at 207. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 208–09. 
 95 Id. at 207. 
 96 Id. at 208–09. 
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Free Exercise Clause.”97  Ultimately, the Court found the State of Wis-
consin to be in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.98 
The effect of RFRA on the free exercise claims by prisoners, in 
light of the standards set out in Sherbert and Yoder, was to tip the scales 
in favor of prisoners’ rights.99  Additionally, both of the rulings in 
Sherbert and Yoder prevailed against arguments made by the States in 
support of economic efficiency, suggesting that favoritism for such 
arguments in earlier cases involving prisoners’ free exercise claims 
would no longer prove superior.100 
F.  The Boerne Ultimatum 
Whether or not the RFRA would lead to such results remained 
unproven, as the Supreme Court struck it down just four years after it 
came into effect.  In City of Boerne v. Flores,101 the Supreme Court con-
sidered a case in which the Archbishop of San Antonio asserted a 
claim under the RFRA.102  A Catholic church in the city of Boerne, 
Texas wanted to expand its building in order to accommodate grow-
ing church attendance.103  The City of Boerne denied the church’s 
application for expansion, arguing that the church had been zoned 
within a protected historic district, which subjected any proposed 
construction to approval by the city’s Historic Landmark Commis-
sion.104  The Archbishop asserted a claim under RFRA, arguing that 
the City of Boerne was unlawfully constraining the Church’s religious 
freedom rights; the City of Boerne responded by challenging the 
constitutionality of RFRA.105  The Court struck down the law on the 
grounds that RFRA was failing to achieve its stated purpose, namely 
that it was too great in scope to combat state laws that promoted reli-
gious bigotry and that it was a breach of the separation of powers.106 
 
 97 Id. at 214. 
 98 Id. at 234. 
 99 See e.g., Sasnett v. Dep’t of Corr., 891 F. Supp 1305 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (holding that prison 
officials could not prevent prisoners from owning religious books and symbols). 
100 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224 (describing the State’s argument that Amish students who did 
not complete high school and later chose to leave Amish life would be unprepared for 
life outside of the Amish community); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (de-
scribing the State’s argument that allowances for compensation for those who could not 
work on Saturdays would damage the unemployment compensation fund). 
101 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
102 Id. at 511–12. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 535–36. 
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The ruling in Boerne signaled that both the legislature and the ju-
diciary believed that there was a need to protect First Amendment re-
ligious rights, but RFRA was not focused enough to achieve this end 
effectively.  The gap left by the annihilation of RFRA was filled by 
Congress three years later. 
G.  RLUIPA:  Restoring the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
Partly in response to the Supreme Court’s actions in Boerne, Con-
gress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(“RLUIPA”)107 in late 2000, in order to enhance religious freedom 
claims made by both prisoners and those struggling against land use 
regulations.108  The Act mandates that: 
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious 
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if 
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the gov-
ernment demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and  
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling gov-
ernmental interest.109 
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the regulation in ques-
tion “substantially burdens” his or her religious freedom rights, and 
the government bears the burden on all other elements of the 
claim.110  The jurisdiction extends to all programs and activities that 
receive financing from the federal government.111  RLUIPA effectively 
upholds the same standards found in RFRA but narrows the scope, 
applying the legislation only to claims involving either land use or in-
carcerated persons.112  Additionally, the compelling interest standard 
is tempered by the least restrictive means test that was used by the 
Eleventh Circuit in Shabazz v. Barnauskas.113  Early on, RLUIPA caused 
a split amongst the circuit courts,114 but was ultimately upheld.115  
 
107 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000). 
108 Id. § 2000cc–1; see also John J. Dvorske, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000cc et seq.), 181 
A.L.R. FED. 247 (2002) (collecting cases). 
109 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a). 
110 Id. § 2000cc–2(b). 
111 Id. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A). 
112 Id. § 2000cc–1. 
113 790 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1986). 
114 See Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing circuit split). 
115 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005). 
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Three cases, Madison v. Riter,116 Cutter v. Wilkinson,117 and Lovelace v. 
Lee118 shed particular light on the courts’ implementation of RLUIPA 
and are discussed below. 
The Fourth Circuit considered Madison v. Riter in 2003, during a 
period where circuit courts had split in their treatment of RLUIPA.119  
Madison was an inmate in a Virginia Department of Corrections pris-
on who adhered to a Christian denomination that obeyed dietary laws 
detailed in the Hebrew Scriptures, requiring him to keep a kosher 
diet.120  While local corrections officials were happy to comply with his 
needs, their overseers in Richmond believed that adequate alterna-
tive diets were already provided in the facility in which Madison was 
incarcerated.121  Madison sued the Department of Corrections, assert-
ing a religious freedom claim under RLUIPA, and the Department of 
Corrections responded by challenging RLUIPA on constitutional 
grounds.122  The Fourth Circuit looked to the Congressional intent 
behind RLUIPA, reasoning that the statute was crafted to comply 
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Boerne, while still protecting the 
religious freedom rights of incarcerated persons.123  The court further 
clarified the problem with free exercise claims that had manifested 
itself during the O’Lone/Turner era, in which free exercise rights and 
other First Amendment rights were adjudicated along the same broad 
standard.  The court gave the example that, under O’Lone/Turner, a 
prisoner’s right to possess pornography would be judged along the 
same standard as his or her right to possess religious materials.124  The 
court held that RLUIPA was the appropriate remedy to this quan-
dary, providing heightened protection to religious freedom rights in 
the penological context.125  Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit held that 
 
116 Madison, 355 F.3d at 316. 
117 Cutter, 544 U.S. 709. 
118 No. 7:03cv00395, 2007 WL 2461750 (W.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2007) (mem.). 
119 355 F.3d at 316 (citing Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding 
RLUIPA); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); Cutter v. Wil-
kinson 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003) (invalidating RLUIPA)). 
120 Id. at 313. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 313–14. 
123 Id. at 315; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535–36 (1997). 
124 Madison, 355 F.3d at 319. 
125 Id.; see also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz. 482 U.S. 342, 351–53 (1987) (ruling that prison 
restrictions on the prayer times of Muslim inmates were based on valid government inter-
ests, efficient, and afforded prisoners other means of exercising their First Amendment 
rights); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (ruling that prison restrictions on written 
correspondence were efficient, valid government interests that still allowed prisoners 
other means to exercise their First Amendment rights). 
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RLUIPA’s application in prisoners’ religious freedom cases was con-
stitutional, and remanded Madison’s case for further consideration.126 
In 2005, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of 
RLUIPA in the penological context in Cutter, putting an end to the 
circuit split.  The inmates in Cutter were all incarcerated within the 
Ohio penal system, and belonged to the respective religious tradi-
tions of Satanist, Wicca, and Asatu religions, and the Church of Jesus 
Christ Christian.127  All had raised claims under RLUIPA alleging that 
the Ohio penal system had failed to allow exercise of their religious 
beliefs.128  The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections 
had countered by challenging the constitutionality of RLUIPA.129  
The Sixth Circuit held below that RLUIPA was unconstitutional, on 
the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause by treating relig-
iously-based claims within prison differently from those without.130  
The Supreme Court reversed, holding RLUIPA to be constitutional.131  
The Court clarified that while RLUIPA applied a compelling interest 
standard to prisoners’ religious freedom claims, it did not trump an 
“institution’s need to maintain order and safety.”132  Additionally, the 
Court held that RLUIPA mandated “due deference” to the superior 
penological knowledge of prison administrators when weighing con-
siderations of safety, efficiency, and cost, and that courts should at-
tempt to interpret compelling governmental interests in terms of the 
full context of the claim.133 
The treatment of prisoners’ religious freedom was further refined 
in 2007 by the Western District of Virginia in Lovelace v. Lee.134  Love-
lace was a member of the Nation of Islam and an inmate at the Keen 
Mountain Correctional Center in Virginia.135  During the month of 
Ramadan, inmates at the correctional center were allowed to alter 
their meal times and attend group prayers in order to comport with 
the religious requirements of Ramadan.136  Once inmates opted to 
adhere to the special schedule during Ramadan, they were not al-
 
126 Madison, 355 F.3d at 322. 
127 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712 (2005). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 713. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 713–14. 
132 Id. at 722. 
133 Id. at 723. 
134 No. 7:03cv00395, 2007 WL 2461750, at *1–*3 (W.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2007) (mem.). 
135 Id. at *1. 
136 Id. 
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lowed to eat regular meals during the day in the prison cafeteria.137  
Violation of this prohibition would cause the inmate to be removed 
from the altered Ramadan scheduling, forcing them to rejoin regular 
prison meal times.138  Lovelace was accused by prison officials of en-
tering the cafeteria during regular meal times, and was then removed 
from the altered Ramadan schedule.139  Lovelace contended that he 
had not entered the dining hall during regular meal times, and that 
his deprivation of the Ramadan schedule was instead a retributive 
move against him by the prison’s cafeteria staff, with whom he had 
argued earlier in the day.140  Lovelace initially sought administrative 
relief, and eventually asserted a claim under RLUIPA.141  Prison offi-
cials later admitted that Lovelace had been falsely accused of break-
ing the prison’s Ramadan rules.142  The religious freedom claim, after 
being reviewed and remanded by the Court of Appeals, was treated to 
both a deferential review under RLUIPA standards and a review un-
der the test set forth in O’Lone/Turner.143  Prison officials argued that 
it was necessary to regulate the prisoners’ observance of Ramadan 
under strict standards, as the allowance called for the use of addi-
tional prison staff to supervise the movement of prisoners during the 
nighttime hours.144  Prison officials argued that these concerns, cou-
pled with the costs of maintaining a special diet and meal times dur-
ing Ramadan, constituted a compelling state interest in dealing 
harshly with inmates who violated the prison’s Ramadan policies.145  
They further argued that there were no less restrictive means of bal-
ancing the prisoners’ right to observe Ramadan against the needs of 
prison safety.146  The court recognized the prison officials’ concern as 
a sufficiently compelling interest under RLUIPA standards; however, 
it also held that the means by which the Ramadan rules were imple-
mented—that violation of the fast precluded a prisoner from taking 
part in any Ramadan observances—were not the least restrictive 
means possible.147  It is interesting, in light of the judicial history of 
 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at *1–*3. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at *3–*5. 
144 Id. at *8–*9. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at *12–*17. 
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prisoners’ freedom of religion claims, that the court considered the 
least restrictive means issue outside of the context of prison costs or 
efficiency.148  The court’s O’Lone/Turner analysis was similarly satisfied 
by the compelling interest arguments of prison officials.149 
The current state of the law provides relief for religious freedom 
cases by prisoners under the standards of RLUIPA.  Courts applying 
RLUIPA will most likely apply a standard that is in line with Loveless 
and Cutter, taking a deferential stance towards a prison administra-
tor’s definition of a compelling interest, while analyzing the least re-
strictive means of the prison regulations as a separate analytical 
prong.150  As a final note, it is important to remember that the more 
lax O’Lone/Turner standards are also still applicable to free exercise 
claims made by prisoners, as RLUIPA exists as a statutory cause of ac-
tion on its own.151 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Under current doctrine, the Standardized Chapel Library Project 
not only constitutes a violation of prisoners’ religious freedom rights 
under RLUIPA and their free exercise rights under the standards set 
forth by the Supreme Court in Turner and O’Lone, but is also against 
public policy.  Even when viewed in a light that is deferential to the 
expertise of prison administrators, the Standardized Chapel Library 
Project, as executed, does not embody a compelling governmental 
interest; it places a substantial burden on the free exercise rights of 
prisoners, and it is not the least restrictive means of accomplishing its 
purported objectives.  Further, the rational connection between the 
actions mandated by the Standardized Chapel Library Project and 
the professed purpose of the Project is tenuous at best.  Alternative 
means are available for accomplishing the goals recommended by the 
federal government for the Project, means that would necessitate less 
of an infringement on prisoners’ free exercise rights.  The simple ca-
taloging of books present in prison chapel libraries—just as public li-
braries across the United States already do—and making these re-
cords available to federal authorities, could easily solve the problem.  
These alternative means may place a mild strain on prison resources, 
but such efforts greatly outweigh the risks run by depriving prisoners 
 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at *18–*19. 
150 See id.; Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005). 
151 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 88–91 (1987). 
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of access to religious texts.  Finally, the Standardized Chapel Library 
Project clearly represents an extreme response to concerns voiced by 
federal authorities.  Before beginning a more detailed legal analysis 
of the Project, it is necessary to clarify its origins and execution. 
A.  Background of the Standardized Chapel Library Project 
The Federal Bureau of Prisons began implementing the Standard-
ized Chapel Library Project early in 2007, but the Project’s roots ex-
tend to a report that was released by the Inspector General of the 
Department of Justice in 2004.152  The Department of Justice’s report 
was prompted by congressional concerns that the Muslim service pro-
viders selected by the Bureau of Prisons might come from groups 
with ties to “exclusionary” and “extreme” forms of Islam.153  The re-
port analyzed the methods used by the Federal Bureau of Prisons in 
its selection of Muslim chaplains, and then offered recommendations 
on monitoring the actions of religious service providers once they 
were allowed access to correctional facilities run by the Federal Bu-
reau of Prisons.154  The Department of Justice Report offered sixteen 
suggestions to the Bureau of Prisons regarding Muslim service pro-
viders.155  The bulk of these suggestions focused on reforming the Bu-
reau of Prisons’ interview process for Muslim service providers, in-
creasing the education of prison staffers with regard to Islam, 
increasing information flow between the Bureau of Prisons and of-
fices of federal law enforcement, improving monitoring for all prison 
religious services, and working closely with existing Muslim chaplains 
 
152 Goodstein, supra note 1, at A13 (providing the basic facts of the implementation of the 
Standardized Chapel Library Project); see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’ SELECTION OF MUSLIM RELIGIOUS 
SERVICES PROVIDERS 3–4 (2004) [hereinafter MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS] 
(analyzing the criteria used by the Bureau of Prisons in selecting Muslim religious repre-
sentatives for inmates, and recommending heightened supervision for such service pro-
viders and the inmates to whom they minister).  For a more developed discussion of the 
aftermath of the Project’s implementation, see Neela Banerjee, Prisons to Return Purged 
Items to Chapels, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007, at A29.  For a more thorough report of the 
motivations behind the Project, the works seized, and the litigation that followed, see Ge-
rard V. Bradley, Unholy Prison Break, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Oct. 2, 2007, available at 
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ZmY4ODIwYjE1MjYwNDU3ZjBlZGQ5YzI4NGU0O
TZmZDg= (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). 
153 MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS, supra note 152, at 1. 
154 Id. at 2. 
155 Id. at 50–55. 
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to better the Muslim service provider selection process.156  The penul-
timate suggestion made in the report dealt with prison libraries: 
The [Bureau of Prisons] should conduct an inventory of chapel books 
and videos and re-screen them to confirm that they are permissible un-
der [Bureau of Prisons] security policies.  The [Bureau of Prisons] 
should consider maintaining a central registry of acceptable material to 
prevent duplication of effort when reviewing these materials.157 
This single suggestion would prove to be the primary motivating fac-
tor for the Standardized Chapel Library Project.158 
Administrators from the Bureau of Prisons found the Department 
of Justice’s recommendations for prison chapel libraries to be too ar-
duous.159  The Bureau began implementing the recommendation by 
attempting to take inventory of all items present in federal prison li-
braries, but soon changed their tactics.160  Rather than finding other 
means to honor the Department of Justice’s recommendation, the 
Bureau of Prisons sought to simplify the matter—they decided to cre-
ate lists of acceptable materials for each of twenty religious categories, 
and remove all materials that did not comport with the standardized 
list.161  This effort was the Standardized Chapel Library Project.162  All 
removed materials were stored for further vetting.163  If a religious 
service provider at the prison wanted to restore access to a specific 
text or object, he or she would be required to examine the entirety of 
the work, fill out a certification form, and then send the form on to 
the central offices of the Bureau in Washington, D.C., where adminis-
trators would decide whether or not to add the text to the Standard-
ized Chapel Library Project.164  The effects of the Project were wide-
spread and absurd.  Instead of storing confiscated materials, some 
books were destroyed.165  The removed texts included works across re-
ligions that had no prior history of inciting radicalism.  The Project 
excluded Jewish texts such as Maimonide’s Code of Jewish Law, Zo-
 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 55. 
158 Goodstein, supra note 1, at A13. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id.  The religious categories recognized by the Bureau of Prisons were:  Bahai, Buddhist, 
Catholic, General Spirituality, Hindu, Islam, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Judaism, Messianic, 
Mormon, Nation of Islam, Native American, Orthodox, Other Religions, Pagan, Protes-
tant, Rastafarian, Sikh, and Yoruba.  Id. 
165 Complaint at 2, Milstein v. Lappin, No. 07–CV–07434 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2007). 
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har, and When Bad Things Happen to Good People by Rabbi Harold S. 
Kushner.166  Christian hymnals and guides, as well as religious com-
mentary such as The Purpose Driven Life by Reverend Rick Warren were 
confiscated.167  Muslim prayer books, prayer guides, and copies of the 
Hadith (the second most important Muslim religious source after the 
Qur’an) were removed.168  The regulations and methodologies be-
hind the selection of titles for the Standardized Chapel Library Pro-
ject were never codified or publicized; instead they were imple-
mented through internal memos at the Bureau of Prisons.169  These 
memos initially called for the destruction of materials removed from 
chapel libraries; later, prison facilities were allowed to store the 
books.170  Widespread protests of the Project led the Bureau of Pris-
ons to halt its implementation late in 2007, but the Bureau has re-
fused to reverse its policy.171 
B.  RLUIPA 
The Standardized Chapel Library Project places a substantial bur-
den on prisoners’ religious freedom.  Even when deference is given 
to the experience of prison administrators and special consideration 
is given to the environment of prison chapel libraries, the purposes 
behind the Project do not rise to the level of a compelling govern-
mental interest.  The Project is also not the least restrictive means of 
accomplishing what the Bureau of Prisons professes is its underlying 
rationale. 
In order to trigger RLUIPA, the prisoner’s religious exercise right 
must be substantially burdened by the actions or regulations of prison 
administrators.172  A burden on religious freedom becomes substantial 
when it places a “significantly great restriction or onus upon such ex-
ercise.”173  In Sanders v. Ryan,174 the District of Arizona held that prison 
administrators did not substantially burden a prisoner’s religious 
freedom when they required him to discard some religious materials 
 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 3. 
169 Id. at 10. 
170 Id. at 10–12. 
171 Goodstein, supra note 1, at A13. 
172 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a) (2000). 
173 Sanders v. Ryan, 484 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1034 (D. Ariz. 2007). 
174 Id. 
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in order to exchange them with an equal number of new ones.175  
Similarly, in Adkins v. Kaspar,176 the Fifth Circuit held that preventing 
a prisoner from observing the Sabbath on a certain day was permissi-
ble if he was allowed to observe the Sabbath on an alternate day.177  
Additionally, in Lovelace v. Lee,178 the Fourth Circuit held that prevent-
ing an inmate from observing the religious practices associated with 
Ramadan did constitute a substantial burden on the inmate’s reli-
gious freedom.179  The onus on religious freedom that leads to a sub-
stantial burden seems to occur when religious activities are limited 
without any kind of reciprocity.  Religious materials can be confis-
cated, but they must be replaced by an equal number of new materi-
als.  Organized worship can be prevented on a certain day, as long as 
it is allowed on another.  The entirety of one kind of religious prac-
tice cannot be taken away.  Likewise, the unilateral removal of non-
approved texts from prison chapel libraries through the Standardized 
Chapel Library Project, an action that greatly depleted the reserves of 
the chapel libraries affected, placed a substantial burden on prison-
ers’ religious freedom.180 
When gauging whether acts or regulations of prison administra-
tors constitute a compelling state interest, deference is given to the 
superior experience of prison authorities, and the alleged compelling 
state interest should be examined in the full context of the regula-
tion.181  Concerns of order and safety within prisons have been widely 
recognized as compelling state interests.182  Concerns that radical re-
ligious groups could negatively impact prison safety, as voiced in the 
Justice Department’s report, comport with the government’s compel-
ling interest in maintaining prison safety.  The Standardized Chapel 
Library Project is out of step with the goals expressed in the Justice 
Department’s review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ selection 
process for Muslim service providers.183  It is clear when examining 
the totality of the Justice Department’s review, that the intention of 
its recommendations was to ensure that the causes of incitement of 
radical Islam would be removed from the federal penal system, and 
 
175 Id. at 1035. 
176 393 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2004). 
177 Id. at 571. 
178 472 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2006). 
179 Id. at 187. 
180 Goodstein, supra note 1, at A13. 
181 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005). 
182 See, e.g., id. at 722. 
183 MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS, supra note 152, at 1. 
  
1158 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:4 
 
that measures would be taken to monitor and harmonize religious 
practices within federal prisons.184  The Standardized Chapel Library 
Project, as executed, departs from this purpose by widely removing 
primarily non-offensive religious materials, and therefore should not 
be viewed as having a rational relation to the compelling governmen-
tal interest of preventing religious extremism in federal prisons.  In 
fact, the widespread outcry from prisoners that accompanied the car-
rying out of the Project185 could be seen as directly going against the 
compelling governmental interest of preserving prison safety.  When 
courts have sanctioned the limiting and removal of religious materials 
as part of a compelling governmental interest in preserving prison 
safety, it has been in the context of removing certain materials that by 
their very nature are clearly capable of inciting religiously motivated 
violence in prisons.  In Marria v. Broaddus,186 the Southern District of 
New York determined that prison officials' absolute ban on Five Per-
center literature constituted a compelling state interest in preserving 
prison safety and precluded summary judgment, as such literature 
could possibly lead to racial and political unrest within the prison sys-
tem.187  In comparison, the Western District of Wisconsin, in Lindell v. 
Casperson,188 held that prison administrators had a compelling gov-
ernmental interest in preventing Wotanists from possessing materials 
relating to Nazism as required by the religion.189  The Standardized 
Chapel Library Project fails to work with such precision, as it does not 
selectively remove materials that could potentially incite violence.  
Such slipshod enforcement should not be seen as an effective means 
of advancing something as important as a compelling governmental 
interest in prison safety. 
The least restrictive means prong of RLUIPA stands alone as a 
separate disqualifying factor for acts or restrictions made by prison 
administrators, and it is not viewed with deference towards the eco-
nomic efficiency of prison operations.190  The simple fact is that the 
Standardized Chapel Library Project is not the least restrictive means 
for furthering the compelling governmental interest in keeping ma-
terials that may incite religious extremism out of prison chapel librar-
 
184 Id. at 50–55. 
185 Goodstein, supra note 1; see also Complaint, supra note 165, at 2–3. 
186 200 F. Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
187 Id. at 298. 
188 360 F. Supp. 2d 932 (W.D. Wis. 2005). 
189 Id. at 954–55. 
190 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a)(2); Lovelace v. Lee, No. 7:03cv00395, 2007 WL 2461750, at 
*16–*17 (W.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2007). 
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ies.  The Project would be far less restrictive if it was carried out as the 
Department of Justice intended.  If the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
cataloged the books in prison chapel libraries, and, if necessary, de-
veloped a system of tracking them, then the few books that could in-
cite religious extremism could be removed and prisoners’ freedom of 
religion would remain unmolested.191  If this project proved to be too 
taxing for prison resources, then the Federal Bureau of Prisons could 
compile an easily updateable list of texts that were known to incite re-
ligious violence and ensure that these were removed from prison 
chapel libraries. 
C.  O’Lone/Turner 
Even under the more permissive O’Lone/Turner standard, the 
Standardized Chapel Library Project is still an unreasonable incur-
sion on prisoners’ free exercise rights.  The test of review of First 
Amendment claims by prisoners established by the Supreme Court in 
Turner and then applied to free exercise claims in O’Lone examines 
acts or restrictions by prison administrators that affect prisoners’ First 
Amendment rights under a four-point standard.  In assessing whether 
or not a prison regulation infringes upon an incarcerated person’s 
constitutional rights, the Court looks to the following balancing test:  
(a) if there is a valid governmental interest that reasonably relates to 
the prison regulation in question; (b) whether under this regulation 
the incarcerated person has other means of exercising his rights; 
(c) how the assertion of this right will impact prison costs and re-
sources; and (d) whether there are alternative means which can be 
used to satisfy the governmental interest.192  Under standards of rea-
sonableness, the Standardized Chapel Library Project, viewed very 
permissibly, does seem to satisfy the legitimate governmental interest 
in protecting the order and safety of prisons by curtailing inmate ac-
cess to materials that might incite religious extremism.  If the Bureau 
of Prisons removes most literature from prison chapel libraries and 
leaves only a few books it knows to be benign, then it is almost as-
sured of preventing inmate access to religious literature that may in-
cite violence.  However, given the actual effect of the Project—
 
191 See MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS, supra note 152, at 55. 
192 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 88–
91 (1987). 
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inciting outcry amongst prisoners—the likelihood of it actually quiet-
ing religious complaints of prisoners is doubtful.193 
The question of whether the prisoners have other means of exer-
cising their rights is debatable.  Since the majority of books in chapel 
libraries tend not to be on the list of acceptable texts maintained by 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the effect of the Standardized Chapel 
Library Project has been to remove the majority of titles from prison 
chapel library shelves.  This presents an unacceptable effect of remov-
ing all titles from religions that may be underrepresented in prison 
chapel libraries.  While prisoners who practice religions that have a 
significant presence in a given chapel library may be able to find al-
ternative reading materials, others may not be so lucky.  Since the 
books are not replaced as they are removed, and the process for get-
ting a book replaced on the shelf is arduous, there is a chance that 
prisoners following certain religions may be seriously deprived of ne-
cessary religious texts for long periods of time.194  Additionally, the 
sensitive nature of religious belief makes it difficult to categorize 
some texts of a given religion as “important” and others as “unneces-
sary,” making the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ list of acceptable titles 
seem dangerously provocative.195 
The costs of the Standardized Chapel Library Project, taken alone, 
are highly economical, as the Project simply involves removing books 
from prison chapel library shelves.  The long-term costs of the Project 
may be higher, depending on the rate at which prisoners request new 
titles, or attempt to have books certified through the time-consuming 
restatement process.196  Lastly, more effective alternatives, discussed 
above, exist for the Project. 
D.  Policy Argument 
The Standardized Chapel Library Project should not be pursued 
as enacted on grounds of public policy, as the execution of the Pro-
ject departs from the original plan recommended by the Department 
of Justice and because the Project has engendered widespread criti-
 
193 See Goodstein, supra note 1, at A13. 
194 See id. 
195 See Complaint, supra note 165, at 2–3.  For example, a Jewish prisoner may desire access 
to a copy of the Torah, but it should not be the place of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to 
say that this same prisoner cannot have access to the Zohar, or the works of Maimonides, 
or the Talmud. 
196 See Goodstein, supra note 1, at A13. 
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cism from public interest groups and legislators.197  While taking steps 
to prevent domestic religious extremism is a legitimate and compel-
ling governmental interest, it remains to be proven whether the 
Standardized Chapel Library Project actually implements the sugges-
tions put forth by the Department of Justice in a matter that accom-
plishes these ends.  Widespread deprivation of religious texts might 
do more to incense religious extremism within the federal prison sys-
tem than the provision of unchecked religious materials would.  
More importantly, the Standardized Chapel Library Project fails to 
honor the Department of Justice’s recommendations to both catalog 
and track the use of materials in prison chapel libraries; while the 
Project ensures that materials in prison chapel libraries will not devi-
ate from a set list, the Bureau of Prisons still has no means of tracking 
the materials, nor does it know which prisons have which materials.198  
Further, support of only twenty broad religious categories raises the 
possibility that the Standardized Chapel Library Project will not 
honor some prisoners’ religious beliefs.199  Lastly, the criticism that 
the Project has drawn from myriad religions and both major political 
parties makes it unlikely that the Department of Justice’s goals for 
tracking religious materials in prison chapel libraries can be success-
fully enacted through the Standardized Chapel Library Project. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Standardized Chapel Library Project is a clear violation of 
prisoners’ religious freedom under RLUIPA and their free exercise 
rights under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Turner 
and O’Lone, and is against public policy.  Even when viewed in a light 
that is deferential to the expertise of prison administrators, the Stan-
dardized Chapel Library Project, as executed, places a substantial 
burden on the free exercise rights of prisoners, fails to comport with 
the compelling state interest of preserving prison safety, and is not 
the least restrictive means of accomplishing its purported objectives.  
Further, the rational connection between the actions mandated by 
the Standardized Chapel Library Project and the professed purpose 
 
197 See MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS, supra note 152, at 1; Goodstein, supra note 1, 
at A13. 
198 MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS, supra note 152, at 55; Goodstein, supra note 1, at 
A13. 
199 See Goodstein, supra note 1, at A13.  For a full list of religious categories considered by the 
Standardized Chapel Library Project, see supra note 164. 
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of the Project, as per the Department of Justice’s recommendations, 
is tenuous at best.  Alternative means are available for accomplishing 
the goals recommended by the federal government for the Project, 
means that would necessitate less of an infringement on prisoners’ 
free exercise rights.  The Federal Bureau of Prisons could simply im-
plement the exact recommendations of the Department of Justice, or 
they could compile an updatable list of unacceptable materials that 
could easily be removed from chapel library shelves.  These alterna-
tive means may place mild strain on prison resources, but such efforts 
greatly outweigh the risks run by depriving prisoners of access to reli-
gious texts, which could possibly incite violence and unrest within 
prison populations.  Finally, the Standardized Chapel Library Project 
clearly represents an extreme response to concerns voiced by federal 
authorities, and it has encountered wide condemnation from both 
public interest groups and legislators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
